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“Account Me Man”:  Economic Incarnation and Common Wealth in Paradise Lost1
Thomas Lay 
tlay@sas.upenn.edu,
tlay80@gmail.com
“The monetary system is essentially a Catholic institution, the credit system essentially 
Protestant.  ‘The Scotch hate gold.’ In the form of paper the monetary existence of commodities 
is only a social one.  It is Faith that brings salvation.”  So wrote Marx in the third volume of 
Capital.2 John Parker has argued that Marx’s observation is more than a bon mot that extends 
base into superstructure; it is part of a “Christological theory of value” whose terms Marx 
derived from the theology of the Incarnation.3 To Parker, Marx’s appropriation of theology was 
not a radical perversion of Christianity.  For centuries, he argues, Christianity told an economic 
narrative:  the story of a people bound to its landlord for a debt incurred in the theft of an apple, a 
debt that might only be redeemed – paid for, that is – by Christ’s body.4 To put it that way 
sounds perverse to us, but Parker suggests that our resistance is the legacy of Early Modern 
Protestantism – of what Peter Stallybrass, writing in Parker’s wake, describes as a Protestant 
“attempt to drive the economics out of belief” by “separating out ... what is brought together in 
the Latin credere (to believe, to trust, to put credit in).”5
This line of Protestant antimaterialism will be familiar to anyone acquainted with 
 
1 This paper is the product of two seminars, one with Stuart Curran, and the other with Peter Stallybrass.  Without 
their insights and guidance, both in and out of the classroom, I could not have written it.  In addition, Michael 
Gamer, tireless as ever in his support of undergraduates, generously offered to read a partial draft, and his 
suggestions were crucial in helping me past some early stumbles.  To all three, I owe a “debt immense of endless 
gratitude.” 
2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. New York:  International Publishers.  Vol. 37 p. 587. 
3 John Parker, God Among Thieves:  Marx’s Christological Theory of Value and the Literature of the English 
Reformation. Diss U Pennsylvania, 1999.  Ann Arbor:  UMI, 1999.  UMI Number 993777.  See especially pp. 31-7, 
67-70, and 77-88.  Parker cites the passage on p. 77. 
4 This is the language of atonement and satisfaction, particularly in its elaboration by St. Anselm (1033-1109) in 
Cur Deus Homo (available in Anselm of Canterbury, ed. and tr., Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, Toronto 
and New York:  The Edwin Mellen Press, 1976, vol. 3, pp.  39-137.)  For Parker’s discussion of Anselm’s influence 
through Luther, see pp.  90-96. 
5 Peter Stallybrass, “The Value of Culture and the Disavowal of Things.” The Culture of Capital:  Properties, 
Cities, and Knowledge in Early Modern England, ed., Henry S. Turner, New York:  Routledge, 2002, p. 282.  See 
also Stallybrass’s delightfully contrarian account of Christianity as “An Economic Story” in that essay, pp. 279-80. 
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countless attacks on Catholics for the idolatry of saint-veneration and the perverse grotesquerie 
of the doctrine of transubstantiation.  It also characterized attacks on Jews for usury.  In 
Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice for instance, the cold hard cash of Shylock’s dreams of 
moneybags and reported cries for his daughter and his ducats are opposed by the transcendence 
of Portia’s “quality of mercy.”6 But as Parker has shown, the usury by which Luther castigated 
Jews is but a suppressed meaning of the very Latin word – credere – by which he claimed 
salvation by faith alone (Parker 126).  Moreover, the economics of belief, still perilously latent in 
Luther’s credit could be eradicated in translation, for, as Parker notes (147-50), Archbishop 
Cranmer did just that in 1549 to the central text of the new Anglican Book of Common Prayer.
The officially sanctioned “Great Bible,” with a preface by Cranmer himself, had joined every 
Early Modern English bible but one in rendering the Lord’s Prayer’s fifth petition “forgeve us 
our dettes, as we forgeve oure detters.”7 The single exception was William Tyndale’s bible of 
1534, which inaccurately translated the Greek “opheilemata” (“debita” in the Vulgate) as 
“trespasses” rather than “debts.”  But Tyndale was a radical Lutheran.  His translation had been 
banned, and in 1536, he had been burned as a heretic in Belgium at the instigation of the Tudor 
government Cranmer already served.  Nevertheless, a decade later, in the new prayer-book’s 
central text Cranmer followed a heretical, inaccurate, solitary exception, and as a result, most 
English-speakers since have learned the Lord’s Prayer’s fifth petition with its economic 
metaphor erased:  “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us.” 
 Parker’s study ends at the outbreak of civil war, his narrative of Protestant and Catholic 
self-differentiation now complicated by political changes and left “hanging ... like a skeleton, a 
 
6 Quotations from Shakespeare are from The Norton Shakespeare, ed., Stephen Greenblatt, et al.  New York:  W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1997.  The quotations are from 2.5.17, 2.8.15-24, and 4.1.179. 
7 The Byble in Englyshe that is to saye the conte[n]t of al the holy scrypture, both of ye olde, and newe 
testame[n]t, with a prologe therinto, made by the reuerende father in God, Thomas archbysshop of Cantorbury...  
London, 1540, Matthew 6:12.  Accessed via Early English Books Online. 
T. Lay, p. 3 
contradictory, hybrid, intricate genealogy” (208).  This essay, then, proposes to examine that 
skeleton’s curious resurrection – one that promised salvation in familiar terms, but now with 
radically new meanings.  As the work of a mid seventeenth-century Protestant, Paradise Lost 
defies the expectations of a century’s debate by its pervasive and explicitly materialist theology 
of debt.  In considering the poem, I hope to suggest a way to extend Parker’s research past 1642 
by examining how the older terms of religious debate were reformulated with radical 
implications not only for theology but for politics.  It will help to begin, however, with the 
political implications already implicit in the erasure of the economics of belief at the century’s 
turn. 
 
i:  Invisible Usury, Invisible Kings
The subordination of the rhetoric of commerce had played out, of course, in a culture of 
proliferating commerce.  Part of what makes The Merchant of Venice so complex is that its 
condemnation of usury transpires in the most commercial of cities and that Portia’s call for 
mercy is on behalf of a merchant who expects from his investments “return / Of thrice three 
times the value of [the] bond” 8 (1.3.154-5).  The play itself was performed in a commercial 
theater that turned familiar stories into profits, its primary capital – clothing – dependent on a 
system of pawnbroking usurious in all but name.9 For even as usury made a convenient 
scapegoat, commerce needed it to thrive:  thus, the 1571 act that legalized usury at rates up to ten 
percent positioned itself as “An Act Against Usury,” with a stated aim of lessening the 
exploitative possibilities of an illegal vice by making it legal.  John Wooley spoke cautiously in 
 
8 Admittedly, it is not from this bond that Antonio makes his profits, but it is clear from the risk involved that he 
stands to profit considerably should his ships return, even if nobody is thoughtless enough to state the point directly. 
9 See chapter seven of Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of 
Memory. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000, esp., p. 181-4. 
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the act’s support, arguing that usury’s “mischief is of the excess, and not otherwise, since to take 
reasonable, or so that both parties might do good, was not hateful.”10 The latter contingency - 
“that both parties might do good” - was consistently the grounds on which usury might find 
support.11 But in The Merchant of Venice, mutual benefit is not the grounds for the primary debt, 
by which neither Shylock nor Antonio stands to profit.  Initially, it is supposed to form the basis 
for Antonio’s secondary loan to Bassanio, which Bassanio urges as a means to win a rich lady 
and pay back prior debts to Antonio (1.1.146-52).  But the matter having been raised once 
subsequently disappears:  we hear no more of literal profit to Antonio, and Bassanio’s ambitions 
for a “lady richly left” (1.1.161) are, even in their very actualization, apparently transformed by 
his disavowal of gold and silver caskets for lead.  It is only in a bizarrely refigured context that 
the language of mutual benefit returns:  it returns in the “quality of mercy” that “blesseth him 
that gives and him that takes” (4.1.181-2).  In Portia’s speech, mercy is as profitable as usury, but 
as if by magic, it is sealed off against sully in the marketplace where it might actually make that 
profit.  For mercy to be above the marketplace, it has to be a part of of a social hierarchy.  Portia, 
herself a representative of the upper echelons of that hierarchy (and yet by her gender usually 
doubly secluded from the marketplace), argues that mercy defines the height of earthly power 
such that fealty at society’s apex to God’s mercy implies society’s fealty to that apex: 
‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest.  It becomes 
The throned monarch better than his crown. 
His scepter shows the force of temporal power, 
The attribute to awe and majesty, 
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 
 
10 A truncated text of the act and of Wooley’s speech, together with other primary materials on usury, may be 
found in Jay L. Halio, ed., Understanding The Merchant of Venice: a Student Casebook to Issues, Sources and 
Historical Documents. Westport, Conn.:  Greenwood Press, 2000, pp. 115-37.  The Wooley quotation is on p. 125. 
11 Noted by David Hawkes in Idols of the Marketplace:  Idolatry and Commodity Fetishism in English Literature, 
1580-1680. New York:  Palgrave, 2001, p. 105.  The condition of mutual benefit was also the grounds on which 
Milton supported the practice.  See De Doctrina Christiana, Book II, pp. 336-43, in The Works of John Milton, New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 1934, vol. 17.  See also the entry in Milton’s commonplace book, in John Milton, 
Complete Prose Works. New Haven & London:  Yale University Press, 1953, (hereinafter, CPW), vol. 1, pp. 418-9. 
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But mercy is above this sceptered sway. 
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings; 
It is an attribute to God himself, 
And earthly power doth then show likest God’s 
When mercy seasons justice.  (4.1.183-92) 
 
With usury reduced to a rhetorical residue, the passage erases the economics of belief in a 
mystified language of “majesty,” and to ground the mystification, it performs a second evasion:  
it appeals to kings in a Republic ruled by an elected duke who at that very moment presides on 
stage before Portia; it invokes monarchy in the visible absence of a monarch. 
 Shakespeare does, of course, celebrate some of the finer aspects of the emerging 
economy in which he participates, both in The Merchant of Venice and elsewhere.  Doing so, 
however, usually involves purging commerce of the dirty means by which it thrives and 
subordinating it both to religion and to earthly power, and especially kings, whether or not they 
exist.  Thus Henry V must reject the commercial world of the tavern to be transformed into “the 
mirror of all Christian Kings,” “the offending Adam” “whipped … out of him” (1.1.30, 2.0.6).  
In the same play, the plundering of churches by Henry’s companions is an unpardonable sin, as 
is the traitors’ plot to “coin [him] into gold” (2.2.95).  Although the company was coining Henry 
into gold before its audience’s eyes, it could do so because the play’s rhetoric had condemned 
the offense.  Indeed, the company acted, at least in a legal fiction, in service to the royal 
household as the Lord Chamberlain’s, later, King’s Men.  Shakespeare’s Kings are at their best 
when, as in All’s Well That Ends Well, they bless the doctor’s daughters of the emerging 
commercial economy for service provided not in mercantile exchange but through bizarre rituals, 
negotiated in rhymed verse, involving folk-like plots of miraculous cures for strange diseases – 
the punishment for failure not bad word of mouth but death, the reward for success not 
remuneration but marriage, and the real agent not the enterprising young woman herself but “the 
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very hand of heaven” (2.3.29-30, 61) in disproof of fools who “say miracles are past” (2.3.1).  It 
is a convenient arrangement by which kings may give the appearance of incorporating the best 
aspects of a crucial new class without having to lower themselves to the vulgarity of commerce.  
To reformulate Greenblatt’s invocation of Kafka, there is a marketplace, no end to a 
marketplace, only not for anyone who matters.12 
What I would like to suggest then is that the suppression of the economic basis of 
Christianity not only defined Protestantism.  It also justified social hierarchies and thus defined a 
Royalist agenda.  In that context, Milton’s explicitly economic theology of Paradise Lost,
inexplicable in terms Protestant ideology, starts to make sense as an assault on the “evil dayes” 
into which the nation had, with the 1660 Restoration of Charlies II, fallen.13 But before turning 
at last to Milton, one final foray into Shakespeare will be useful. 
 
ii:  The Return of the Invisible King; The Fellowship of the Kingless
For us, the word “redeem” is familiar both in its Latin meaning of buying back and in its 
Christian meaning (more often expressed in the nouns “redeemer” and “redemption”) of 
deliverance from sin, but it rare now to acknowledge that the latter meaning derives from the 
former.  The distinction seems to have been in place by Milton’s time.  Shakespeare uses both 
senses of the word and its variant forms forty-eight times but not one instance recalls Christian 
redemption as an economic metaphor; rather, on the few occasions where the two senses appear 
to converge in pun, the point is to subordinate economic to spiritual redemption.14 The  plot of 
 
12 Stephen Greenblatt, “Invisible Bullets:  Renaissance authority and its subversion, Henry IV, Henry V,” in 
Political Shakespeare:  New Essays in Cultural Materialism, ed., Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield.  Ithaca and 
London:  Cornell University Press, 1985, p 47. 
13 Quotations from Milton’s poetry are from The Complete Poetry of John Milton, ed., John T. Shawcross.  New 
York:  Anchor Books, 1971. 
14 Based on Open Source Shakespeare’s concordance at 
<http://www.opensourceshakespeare.com/concordance/>. 
T. Lay, p. 7 
Measure for Measure springs from the deputy Angelo’s proposal that Isabella “redeem”15 her 
condemned brother Claudio (2.4.53, 163) by submitting to Angelo’s lust, to which she makes the 
opposition between redemption’s temporal and spiritual meanings explicit: “Better it were a 
brother died at once / Than that a sister, by redeeming him, / Should die forever” (2.4.107-9).  
The opposition continues through a subsequent exchange between Isabella and Claudio, and is 
only resolved by the subordination of an exchange economy to fealty.  The Duke, disguised as a 
monk, promises to “redeem” Claudio, while doing “no stain to [her] own gracious person” 
(3.1.199-200).  In the Duke’s monastic garb, the promise suggests a subordination of corrupt 
dealings to religious piety, but it turns out to be a promise that he cannot as a monk fulfill.  It is 
only by his return to power in the final scene that he makes good on his promise, emerging from 
disguise as a sort of Deus ex machine - or rather, Rex ex machina, for now his title changes.  
After having been known only as “the Duke,” he is now five times described as “royal” and 
seven times as a “prince,” both epithets newly acquired in the final scene.16 In his new royal 
authority, the Duke replaces Angelo’s economy of bribes with one of payment for ill deeds, 
which he then converts to one of mercy, thereby acquiring the authority for the surprising final 
lines in which he asks Isabella to forgo the convent and marry him.  Given his stature and 
Isabella’s implicit debt to him, and given her repeated vows of eternal chastity, the proposal is 
not far from Angelo’s, but the play sanctions it in a “Royal prince” (5.1.57) and not in a 
“precise” (1.3.50) bureaucrat.  The difference between the two is that Angelo’s proposal is 
sullied by the economic terms of redemption, whereas the Duke’s redemption of Claudio creates 
 
15 The use combines the senses of paying for (OED 1) and freeing (OED 3). 
16 Admittedly, the term “Prince” may be applied to a Duke (OED 2a and 5).  “Royal” is less plausible, however: 
while the OED does offer definitions that refer generally to sovereigns, the examples given nearly all refer to Kings 
and Queens.  OED 8c gives “having rank comparable to that of a king,” but the OED’s examples are all consciously 
figurative (e.g., “royal merchant”).  The point of an alteration in nomenclature at this point in the play, I think, 
however plausible that nomenclature may be, is to fudge the matter so as to appear to produce a non-existent king. 
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an implicit debt in Isabella that, crucially, is not spoken of in the economic terms I am using for 
it.  It is that implied redemption of debt in marriage that in turn redeems for the audience the 
generic promise that the play has hitherto left to an unusual degree in doubt.  The audience 
members get the resolution they had speculated on when they purchased tickets in hopes of 
getting more in enjoyment than they paid in coinage.  Meanwhile, the company profits by 
denying the idea of profit.  Benefit is mutual, not, it seems, by usury, but in a form of redemption 
that refuses to acknowledge its basis in debt.17 
Consider then, by contrast, the rendering of the Incarnation in Paradise Lost, in the 
explicit terms of the redemption of debt.  In Book III, God seeks, in advance of the fall, a way to 
“renew18 / [man’s] lapsed powers, though forfeit and enthrall’d / By sin to foul exorbitant 
desires” (175-7) so that he may “to me owe / All his deliv’rance, and to none but me” (181-2).  
Man, it seems, has incurred an unrepayable debt, and in “losing all, / To expiate his treason hath 
naught left” (206-7).  Man then, must die unless someone else should volunteer to “pay / The 
rigid satisfaction,19 death for death” (211-2) and so “redeem Man’s mortal crime” (214-5).  
“Without redemption, all mankind” (222) would be damned but for the Son’s “dearest” (226) 
 
17 The only other instance I have found in Shakespeare of redemption’s two senses converging is in  Richard III. 
In Act I, scene iv, Clarence entreats his hired murderers to forgo what we know to be a contracted murder “as [they] 
hope to have redemption / By Christ’s dear blood, shed for our grievous sins” (1.4.177-8).  The murder is a matter of 
payment; Christ’s redemption is mystified as a matter of sin.  Thus monetary redemption precludes spiritual 
redemption, and any pun is necessarily oppositional.  Forty lines later, when Clarence promises, to great dramatic 
irony, that Richard – not Christ – will make the murderers a better offer for mercy (218-9), faith in an exchange 
economy is revealed as belief in a demi-devil.  One instance between Shakespeare and Milton in which the word 
does refer to the economics of belief is George Herbert’s sonnet “Redemption” in The Temple. (George Herbert, 
The Complete English Poems, ed., John Tobin.  London:  Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 35-6).  The sonnet starts by 
telling an economic story about a man’s debt to his landlord, only to reveal itself as a story of Christian redemption 
by its final couplet, which features another man granting his suit as he dies among “thieves and murderers.”  Time 
has not permitted a careful study of Herbert or of the word’s history between Shakespeare and Milton, but I wonder 
if The Temple didn’t make its point by treating seriously a discourse uncommon by 1633. 
18 Italics in this section are mine, and in order to avoid confusion, I have changed to Roman the proper names that 
are italicized in Shawcross’s text. 
19 The OED cites this instance “satisfaction” under definition 1a:  “The payment in full of a debt, or the fulfilment 
of an obligation or claim; the atoning for (rarely of) an injury, offence, or fault by reparation, compensation, or the 
endurance of punishment.” 
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offer.  Since mankind, “Indebted and undon, hath none to bring” (235), the Son declares: 
Behold mee then, mee for him, life for life 
I offer, on me let thine anger fall; 
Account mee man; I for his sake will leave 
Thy bosom, and this glorie next to thee 
Freely put off, and for him lastly die 
Well pleas’d, on me let Death wreck all his rage. (236-41) 
 
The bargain is so pleasing to God that the two of them work out a deal whereby God can have 
his son and sacrifice him too:  “Though now to Death I yield, and am his due,” says the Son, “yet 
that debt paid, I shall rise victorious, and subdue20” death itself (245-50) and so “redeem” (260, 
281) mankind. 
 At this point, something new happens.  The Incarnation, we discover, is not only 
economic, but also egalitarian.  God praises the Son in the republican rhetoric of being “found / 
By Merit more then Birthright Son of God” (308-9).  By praising merit over birthright, God puts 
humans on earth without social hierarchies, in fealty only to Heaven: 
Here shalt thou sit incarnate, here shalt Reign 
Both God and Man, Son, both of God and Man, 
Anointed universal King; all Power 
I give to thee, reign for ever, and assume 
Thy Merits; under thee as Head Supreme 
Thrones, Princedoms, Powers, Dominions I reduce: 
All knees to thee shall bow.  (315-21) 
 
This argument of the Son’s annihilation of earthly kingship by the kingdom of heaven provides 
the teleology for Michael’s narrative in Book XII, a narrative of Israel’s history from kingly 
enthrallment to liberty through the incarnation and resurrection of the Son as Earth’s only king.  
The trajectory starts with Adam’s lament of “Authority usurpt, from God not giv’n” (66), from 
which proceeds some of the work’s most boldly anti-Royalist rhetoric: 
He gave us onely over Beast, Fish, Fowl 
Dominion absolute; that right we hold 
 
20 This instance, unsupported on definitional and etymological grounds, I claim only as a likely pun. 
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By his donation; but Man over men 
He made not Lord; such title to himself 
Reserving, human left from human free. (67-71) 
 
Michael then tells Adam of Israel’s enslavement in Egypt to Pharao and his kingly successor21 
(155-222), of the Babylonian captivity (339-49) under kings slightly more amicable but only 
because they are so “dispos’d” by God (349), and then of deliverance marred by priests who 
 seise 
The Scepter, and regard not Davids Sons 
Then loose it to a stranger, that the true 
Anointed King Messiah might be born 
Barr’d of his right.  (356-60) 
 
In this narrative, Michael does praise a king – David – for “piety” and “puisant deeds” (321-2), 
but at the very moment that he tells Adam that David’s “Regal Throne / For ever shall endure” 
(323-4), he proclaims kingship’s endurance by means of its earthly abolition: 
 the like shall sing 
All Prophecie, that of the Royal Stock 
Of David (so I name this King) shall rise 
A Son, the Womans Seed to thee foretold, 
Foretold to Abraham, as in whom shall trust 
All Nations, and to Kings foretold, of Kings 
The last, for of his Reign shall be no end.  (324-30) 
 
At the close of Michael’s history, the word redeem returns five times (408, 424, 434, 445, 573), 
and now, it takes a specific economic sense:  that of paying for someone’s liberation (OED 3) in 
“ransom paid, which Man from death redeems, / His [Christ’s] death for Man” (424-5).  
Although Milton, perhaps wary of censorship, limits redemption here to ransom from death, he 
places it at the climax of a narrative of ransom from kingship.  Yet even here, there is a 
suggestion that triumph over death entails triumph over kings in Adam’s “Needs must the 
Serpent now his capital bruise / Expect” (383-4).  Modern editors uniformly gloss “capital” as 
 
21 Fowler notes that Milton names this king Busiris in Book I.  (Paradise Lost, ed., Alastair Fowler, Second Ed.  
London and New York:  Longman, 1998, note to XII, ll. 164-8).  In book XII, by contrast, he is known by title 
rather than name as “a sequent King” (165), “the lawless Tyrant” (173) and “th’ obdurat King” (205). 
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conflating the meanings “mortal” and “on the head,” 22 but the pairing of those two senses in a 
pun calls attention to the word itself and suggests the “capital bruise” that had dominated public 
consciousness since 1649:  the decapitation of a King. 
 So far, I have not attempted to discuss the economic workings of redemption in Paradise 
Lost, but have rather traced its language, as though I were a linguist pursuing an empirical study.  
I will delve more throughly into the poem’s economy presently, but first let us pause to consider 
the rather schematic opposition I have set up between Milton and Shakespeare and the opposing 
ideologies it suggests.  Shakespeare – money-lending, malt-hoarding, professional writer who 
buys the status of Gentleman – would like to efface the commercialism of his art (and thereby 
sell more tickets) and so places the stories he sells in a mystified social hierarchy to convince his 
audience of a value beyond price.23 Milton – regicidal advocate for the Commonwealth – would 
like to abolish social hierarchies and bind humanity in common to God, and so he conceives of 
humanity’s relationship to God in flatly economic terms that leave no place for Kings as God’s 
earthly substitutes.  But for Milton, that leaves a question:  if Shakespeare’s effacement of 
commerce serves his own commerce, what economy does an economic Incarnation bring with it 
into Milton’s Commonwealth?  From our perspective, my comparison would seem to suggest 
 
22 In addition to the Shawcross and Fowler editions already cited, I have checked Stephen Orgel and Jonathan 
Goldberg’s Oxford World Classics edition (2004), John Leonard’s Penguin Edition (1998), Scott Elledge’s Norton 
Edition (1993), and Roy Flannagan’s edition for Prentice Hall (1993). 
23 There are, of course, grounds for complicating this account of Shakespeare, starting, I think, with Timon of 
Athens, a play that to me seems utterly bent on deconstructing its own performance.  Not only does it feature the 
most bizarre revelation of a death in all of Shakespeare (Timon seems to have dug, deposited himself in, and 
covered over his own grave, subsequently engraving a first-person account of his death on the tombstone above it, 
all of which we learn because a soldier finds the tombstone in the woods, and, being illiterate, makes a wax 
impression of it), but it also offers an elaborate demystification of capitalist constructions of value (a subject I have 
pursued in another essay).  The play was much admired by Marx, who expounded on Timon’s soliloquies about gold 
(a “visible god”) in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. See The Marx-Engels Reader, ed., Robert 
C. Tucker.  New York:  Norton,  2nd Edition, 1978, pp. 101-5.  Still, one wonders if Timon’s apparent lack of 
completion is a consequence of its unpalatability in the commercial theater.  For Parker’s account of Shakespearean 
drama, which differs somewhat from mine in emphasizing the role of residual religious ceremony in establishing 
fetishized value, see “What a Piece of Work is Man:  Shakespearean Drama as Marxian Fetish, the Fetish as 
Sacremental Sublime,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, Fall 2004, pp. 643-72. 
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that an economic incarnation blesses the marketplace as a space with an authority of its own, an 
authority that might take the place of mystified Royal power.  But Paradise Lost never makes 
that argument.  Indeed, the oft-noted presence in the work of a counter-narrative of Satanic 
imperialism would seem to suggest the reverse, as would Milton’s most explicit statement of his 
view of an ideal Republican society, The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free 
Commonwealth (1660), which closes with revulsion at the “rotten” idol worship (CPW, VII, 462) 
of those who would “prostitute religion and libertie to the vain and groundless apprehension, that 
nothing but kingship can restore trade” (461).  For all of Paradise Lost’s economic language, not 
only in the Incarnation, but in the language of labor and of empire, and for all its concern with its 
own historical moment, the poem, I think, refuses to affirm positively a particular economic 
model for postlapsarian society.  It ends, rather with Michael leaving Adam and Eve, the world 
“all before them, where to choose” but also with “Providence thir guide” (XII, 646-7).  Choice, 
then is not the illusory “free choice” that Satan dictates from his throne in Hell (II, 19) and which 
we might associate with a free market.  Rather, choice emerges for the reader out of the tension 
between the economies of Heaven and Hell.  What those two economies reveal is that Paradise 
Lost’s economic theology, far from justifying the market’s ways to men, rather reveals what the 
ideology of a market economy like Shakespeare’s necessarily obscures:  the idolatry by which 
markets construct value. 
 
iii:  Productive and Reductive Incarnations
Blair Hoxby has recently taken up the cause of a Milton devoted until the Restoration to 
the free market.24 To Hoxby, Milton’s call in Areopagitica for a free press entails “putting his 
 
24 Blair Hoxby, Mammon’s Music:  Literature and Economics in the Age of Milton. New Haven and London:  
Yale University Press, 2002., p. 47.  Hoxby argues that Milton’s faith in the market extends into The Readie and 
T. Lay, p. 13 
faith not in men but in a system of commerce and exchange.  He puts his faith in the market” 
(45).  But David Hawkes has criticized Hoxby for an anachronistic assumption of the natural 
authority of markets.  To Hawkes, Milton’s limited support for free trade was subordinate to his 
devotion to keeping religion uncommodified.  Hoxby’s “enthusiasm for the market,” Hawkes 
argues, “goads him into making claims that students of Milton ought to recognize as satanic:  
‘the market is a means by which imperfect men may, in the long term, approximate the wisdom 
of God.’”25 As an instance of Areopagitica’s subordination of economy to religion, Hawkes 
cites Milton’s scorn for “a wealthy man addicted to his pleasure and to his profits”: 
[F]ain he would have the name to be religious, fain he would bear up with his 
neighbours in that.  What does he therefore, but resolvs to give over toyling, and 
to find himself out som factor, to whose care and credit he may commit the whole 
managing of his religious affairs; som Divine of note and estimation that must be.  
To him he adheres, resigns the whole ware-house of his religion, but with all the 
locks and keyes into his custody; and indeed makes the very person of that man 
his religion; esteems his associating with him a sufficient evidence and 
commendatory of his own piety. So that a man may say his religion is now no 
more within himself, but is becom a dividual movable, and goes and comes neer 
him, according as that good man frequents the house. ... [H]is Religion walks 
abroad at eight, and leavs this kind entertainer in the shop trading all day without 
his religion.  (CPW vol II, 444-5) 
 
To Hoxby, this passage is a call for tradesmen to integrate religious and secular life and become 
“enterprisers in all aspects of the public sphere” (45).  Just what sort of integration Hoxby is 
imagining is unclear; religion receives only perfunctory treatment in the chapter.  To Hoxby, 
integration seems to mean no more than bringing an enterprising spirit to church.  But this is 
 
Easie Way, but that by 1660, trade had become an effective Royalist argument, so that Milton hedged his bets by 
inveighing against it at the essay’s close (77-90).  He goes on to argue that the victory of the Royalist argument for 
trade embittered Milton to the marketplace, and he reads Paradise Lost as a conservative critique of trade (150-177). 
25 “The Concept of the ‘Hireling’ in Milton’s Theology,” Milton Studies, vol. 43, 2004, pp. 64-85, specifically p. 
67.  Hawkes here is responding to an earlier essay by Hoxby (“The Trade of Truth Advanced:  Areopagitica,
Economic Discourse, and Libertarian Reform,” Milton Studies, vol. 36, 1998, pp. 117-202.) substantially 
incorporated into Mammon’s Music, which Hawkes does not discuss in this essay.  The passage Hawkes quotes is on 
p. 188 of the earlier Hoxby essay; in Mammon’s Music, Hoxby qualified his earlier statement:  “...approximate, if 
never really attain, the wisdom of God” (41).  See also Hawkes’ review of Mammon’s Music in TLS, 2 April 2004, 
p. 10 and Hoxby’s rejoinder in TLS, 30 April 2004.  (TLS fails to provide page numbers with online retrieval.) 
T. Lay, p. 14 
precisely the sort of thing Milton is decrying.  Milton’s assault on religion that becomes a 
“dividual movable” is a critique of tradesmen who use priests as a sort of prosthetic religion, that 
is in Hawkes’ words alienated26 and “relegat[ed] to a form of property.”  “Milton is appalled,” 
says Hawkes, “by the idea that religion can be conceived of as a thing, an alienable commodity.”  
Rather, he says, “radical Protestant[s] ... ‘understood their faith, or conscience, as a part of 
themselves, and so as something which they owned absolutely and individually’” (68)27.
As a rejoinder to Hoxby’s celebration of an Areopagitica that would seem to anticipate 
Adam Smith, Hawkes’ argument is, I think, substantially right.  But he makes two assumptions 
that, while familiar as interpretations of Protestantism, misconstrue Milton’s theology, 
particularly in Paradise Lost. First, Hawkes understands commodification as a matter of valuing 
things. Second, he locates Milton’s hope for non-commodified religion in the individual’s 
ownership of his or her faith.28 But in Paradise Lost, to “believe / in [Christ’s] redemption” is to 
have “imputed ... by faith, his merits,” by way of Christ “coming in the flesh” to redeem “the 
sins / of all mankind, with him there crucifi’d” (XII, 407-8, 405, 416-7).  Faith is a matter of 
things – of the incarnation of flesh, and moreover, of value held in not “individually” (as we use 
the term) but in common, – or, in political terms, in Common-wealth. 
 The modern sense of the word “individual” to signify the personal – that which cannot be 
divided because it is the smallest divisible unit – dates from the seventeenth century, but Milton 
 
26 Hawkes points out in a note that “the word ‘alienation’ boasts a pedigree that may seem surprisingly long.  It 
was regularly used in the seventeenth century to carry the modern sense of an illegitimate or unethical 
externalization of property” (84 n13). 
27 Hawkes is quoting Laura Bruce, The Idea of Property in Seventeenth-Century England (Manchester, 1998), 5. 
28 Hawkes repeats both of these assumptions on the next page in positing a difference “in the thought of Milton 
and [some of] his contemporaries – the difference between conceiving of oneself as an integral, unitary, and 
indivisible being, and the conception that imagines it is possible for one part of the self to alienate, or ‘sell,’ another.  
The latter notion must inevitably imagine the part of the self that is sold as a thing, a commodity” (69).  Hawkes’s 
essay is specific to several prose tracts, but he posits a stability in Milton’s early declaration that “Antichrist is 
Mammon’s son,” which, Hawkes writes, “deserves to be understood as a definitive statement of his iconoclastic 
theology, and as a manifesto to which he remained faithful throughout his life (82).  Hawkes also implies a 
continuity of his argument to Paradise Lost in deeming Hoxby’s celebration of the market “satanic” (67). 
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used the word in its older meaning – that which cannot be divided off because it is a part of a 
whole.29 When Hawkes contrasts Milton’s “dividual movable” with Protestant individual faith, 
he reverses what the word meant for Milton, so that Hawkes’s “individual” is for Milton a 
“dividual movable.”  Consider Milton’s use of the word “individual” in God’s pronouncement in 
Book V of Paradise Lost:
Hear all ye Angels, Progenie of Light, 
Thrones, Dominiations, Princedoms, Vertues, Powers, 
Hear my Decree, which unrevok’t shall stand. 
This day I have begot whom I declare 
My onely Son, and on this holy Hill 
Him have anointed, whom ye now behold 
At my right hand; your Head I him appoint; 
And by my Self have sworn to him shall bow 
All knees in Heav’n, and shall confess him Lord: 
Under his great Vice-gerent Reign abide 
United as one individual Soul 
For ever happie:  him who disobeys 
Me disobeys, breaks union, and that day 
Cast out from God and blessed vision, falls 
Into utter darkness, deep ingulft, his place 
Ordaind without redemption, without end. (600-15) 
 
For Milton, the “individual soul” is not the solitary person but the community.  To join that 
community means to disavow personal thrones and dominions to participate in a communal 
redemptive economy. 
 Indeed, those who do abandon Heaven’s community are not the faithful, but rather the 
rebel angels.  Hell is a place of kingship – of Satan’s throne (II, 1), Death’s crown (II, 673), and 
Molloch’s Kingly name (I, 392 and II, 43)30 – because it is, again and again, distinguished by an 
inward turn.  For Satan to declare “the mind ... its own place” (I, 254) and go off alone so that so 
that “none shall partake” in his personal glory (II, 465-6), has tempted many subsequent readers 
 
29 My discussion of the meaning of “individual” derives both from the OED and from comments in class by Peter 
Stallybrass.  The paraphrases I give are of OED definitions 1 and 3 respectively. 
30 Both instances refer to him as a king because Molloch is Hebrew for “king.” 
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to his side.  Later readers of Milton have also tended to enjoy Satan’s soliloquies more than 
God’s dreary colloquies.  But for Satan, the price of that solitude is that he 
 like a devillish Engine back recoils 
Upon himself; horror and doubt distract 
His troubl’d thoughts, and from the bottom stirr 
The Hell within him, for within him Hell 
He brings, and round about him, nor from Hell 
One step no more then from himself can fly 
By change of place.  (IV, 18-23) 
 
Satan’s first grand soliloquy in Book IV, arises out of “despair” (23, 74, 114, 156) at being cast 
out of Heaven’s economy for 
Warring in Heav’n against Heavn’s matchless King: 
Ah wherefore! he deserv’d no such return 
From me, whom he created what I was 
In that bright eminence, and with his good 
Upbraided none; nor was his service hard. 
What could be less then to afford him praise 
The easiest recompence, and pay him thanks, 
How due!  yet all his good prov’d ill in me, 
And wrought but malice; lifted up so high 
I sdeined subjection, and thought one step higher 
Would set me highest, and in a moment quit 
The debt immense of endless gratitude 
So burthensome still paying, still to ow; 
Forgetful what from him I still receiv’d 
And understood not that a grateful mind 
By owing owes not, but still pays, at once 
Indebted and discharg’d.  (41-57) 
 
If in soliloquy, Satan can recognize his error, he cannot by soliloquy rectify it.  “Which way I flie 
is Hell; my self am Hell,” he discovers (75).  Divorced from Heaven’s ever-fluid economy of 
debt that paradoxically sustains through owing, Satan has only himself left.  “All good to me is 
lost; / Evil be thou my Good,” he declares and embraces evil to colonize an alien space and gain 
“at least / Divided Empire with Heav’ns King” in “this new World” (109-13). 
 As Satan’s soliloquy frames his alienation from Heaven in terms of a pair of economies – 
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Heaven’s “debt immense of endless gratitude” and his own imperial ambitions – it would be well 
here to return to the other problematic aspect of Hawkes’s reading of Milton’s scorn for 
commerce that would alienate religion.  To Hawkes, “Milton is appalled by the idea that religion 
can be conceived of as a thing, an alienable commodity.  He is angered by the prospect of a 
properly subjective experience being given objective form” (68).  But the greatest subject of 
Paradise Lost is Satan, literally “thrown under”31 – and thrown under because he is “self-
tempted, self-depraved” (II, 130), alienated because he quits the heavenly economy and turns 
instead to the mind as “its own place.”  The greatest object, on the other hand is the Son, whose 
flesh pays for the debts of the whole human race.  The problem here is a consequence of 
Hawkes’s identification of commodities with things, in what Jones and Stallybrass consider a 
misreading of Marx: 
Marx’s critique of capitalism is not a critique of “materialism.”  Marx, of course, 
famously developed a theory of fetishism, but it was a theory of fetishism of the 
commodity, not of the object. For Marx, the commodity comes to life through the 
death of the object.  What defines a commodity always lies outside any specific 
object, and depends upon the equating of a specific quantity of paper cups with a 
specific quantity of coal or diamonds or academic books.32 
By understanding Milton’s reservations about commerce as the result of a concern with things, 
Hawkes elides the distinction that is at the center of Paradise Lost:  the conflict between a 
heavenly economy that properly values things and a hellish commercial economy bent on 
 
31 The word’s etymological meaning, as Stallybrass reminds us (“Value of Culture,” 175), citing Althuser.  
Indeed , the last instance of the word in Paradise Lost, “the subjected plain” (XII, 640) requires a literal translation 
of the Latin.  The OED’s first instance of the modern sense (def. 9) dates from 1796, with transitional instances 
starting in 1682.  My thinking about subjects and objects is heavily indebted to the Stallybrass essay and to the 
collection Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture, ed., de Grazia, Quilligan, and Stallybrass. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995.  However the only prior attempts that I am aware of to understand subjects and 
objects and commodities and things in the terms outlined in that volume are Maureen Quilligan’s contribution 
therein (“Freedom, Service, and the Trade in Slaves:  The Problem of Labor in Paradise Lost,” pp. 213-29), which 
relates the work’s treatment of labor to contemporary discourses of slavery, and Jones and Stallybrass’s brief 
discussion of the passage in Book X in which The Son clothes Adam and Eve (209-23), which they read as a form of 
livery (20-21). 
32 Renaissance Clothing, p. 8.  See also Stallybrass’s “Value of Culture” essay, passim, Parker, esp pp. 21-51, and 
the introduction to Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture.
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overprizing things – apples, for instance – and selling them as commodities to people who don’t 
need them. 
 Let’s go back to the economy of debt in Book III.  From our sense of religion, it is odd to 
think of the Incarnation as economic, but  the converse is also true:  from the standpoint of 
modern capitalism, it’s odd to think of an economy based on flesh.  Man’s debt is redeemed by 
the Son’s body, “Made flesh” (284), and it is only by being a part of an economy of living things 
– an economy in which value is inherent rather than representational – that the Son manages 
what sounds to us like an impossible deal, in which he pays the debt and yet reascends, bringing 
mankind with him.  God redeems man’s debt by “joyn[ing]” mankind’s “Nature” to the Son’s 
(282), without “less’n[ing] or degrad[ing] [his] own” (304), and the language here turns 
horticultural:  the Son, born by “Virgin seed” (284), restores man “As from a second root” (288) 
to “live in [the Son] transplanted, and from [him] / Receive new life” (293-4).  From our 
perspective, to pay a debt means losing that which you pay, but a debt based on living things can 
be productive in its own right.  What Satan has failed to understand is that Heaven’s debt is a 
productive debt of “endless gratitude,” in which “a grateful mind / By owing owes not, but still 
pays, at once / Indebted and discharg’d” (IV, 52, 55-7).  Satan has conceived of debt as we 
conceive of it – as something to be paid off.  But Heaven’s debt is one of mutual benefit to all 
who partake, so that in paying, one “still receiv[es]” (IV, 53). 
 Whereas Heaven’s economy places value in living things without an intermediate symbol 
of currency, Hell’s economy takes inanimate things and ascribes to them a value beyond what 
inheres in them.  The first thing the fallen angels do in Book I to build a home in Hell is to seek 
out gold, not for its physical properties but because of its apparently inherent value: 
 Mammon led them on, 
Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell 
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From heav’n, for ev’n in heav’n his looks and thoughts 
Were always downward bent, admiring more 
The riches of Heavn’s pavement, trod’n Gold 
Then aught divine or holy else enjoy’d 
In vision beatific:  by him first 
Men also, and by his suggestion taught 
Ransack’d the Center, and with impious hands 
Rifl’d the bowels of thir mother Earth 
For Treasures better hid.  Soon had his crew 
Op’nd into the Hill a spacious wound 
And dig’d out ribs of Gold.  Let none admire 
That riches grow in Hell; that soyl may best 
Deserve the precious bane.  (I, 678-92) 
 
What this passage makes clear is gold is not a “bane” in and of itself; if it were, it could hardly 
pave the floor of Heaven.  It only becomes a bane socially by being understood as “riches.”  The 
problem with gold for the rebel angels is that Mammon (literally, “wealth”33) imputes a value to 
it beyond its use as a floor, and by gazing only downward alienates himself from a heavenly 
economy that uses gold not as a symbolic form of value, but as something to tread upon.  In 
doing so, he encourages men to destroy the organic earth that might fertilize crops in favor of a 
metal that, when they treat it as precious, poisons rather than sustains them.  The problem of 
sustenance reappears in Mammon’s speech in Book II, in which, having left Heaven’s economy 
of “worship paid” (248), he calls on the rebel angels to “rather seek / Our own good from our 
selves, and from our own / Live to our selves, though in this vast recess, / Free, and to none 
accountable” (252-5). The problem is that in Paradise Lost, to turn within the self is insufficient 
for sustenance.  Value comes from flesh shared socially; one only attains it by being 
“accountable.”  Thus Mammon inevitably turns outside himself, and not to community, but 
rather to “hidden lustre, Gemms and Gold ... from whence to raise / Magnificence” (271-3).  In 
the economy of Hell, the inward turn is insufficient to provide sustenance, and so the rebel 
angels turn outward to seek value elsewhere. 
 
33 See OED etymology.  It comes through post-classical Latin from Greek and ultimately from Aramaic. 
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 For Satan, the outward turn is a turn to colonize.  Many critics have noted that Satan’s 
voyage is represented as a colonial voyage to a “new world” (I, 650; II, 403, 867; IV, 34, 113, 
391; X, 257, 377).  David Quint has called attention to the commercial aspect of Satan’s voyage, 
particularly in Book II.  Quint cites the comparison of Satan to a merchant bringing spices from 
the Indies (636-43), and argues that “the passage retrospectively lends a mercantile note to 
Beelzebub’s earlier talk of ‘enterprise’ (345) and ‘some advantageous act’ (363), and it colors 
the exchange between Satan and Chaos about ‘recompense’ (981), ‘advantage’ (987), and ‘gain’ 
(1009).”34 I would go further to argue that the roots of Satan’s mission in “covert guile” rather 
than “open Warr” (II, 41) necessarily emphasizes the commercial aspects of empire.  His object 
is to lure Adam and Eve away from God, which he accomplishes by convincing them to misprize 
an apple. 
 Yet for all Satan’s success in colonizing a new world, his economy of inwardness 
ultimately proves reductive.  In Book IX, Satan had decided that he needed a subjective form 
other than himself to win his prize, and so he sought to take the form of the serpent, declaring, 
O foul descent!  that I who erst contended 
With Gods to sit the highest, am now constraind 
Into a Beast, and mixt with bestial slime 
This essence to incarnate and imbrute, 
That to the hight of Deity aspir’d; 
But what will not Ambition and Revenge 
Descend to?  who aspires must down as low 
 
34 David Quint, Epic and Empire:  Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton. Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1993, pp. 265.  Quint argues that Milton deflates Satan by turning what ought to be heroic 
adventures into mercantile adventures, with the result that the work “cannot be accommodated to epic terms, for epic 
does not celebrate bourgeois heroes, however heroic they may be” (266).  Quint approaches the work from a generic 
perspective, arguing that as an epic written by a loser, Paradise Lost turns away from the imperial implications of 
epic toward romance.  Paul Stevens has attempted to complicate Quint’s view by suggesting that “Satan’s journey ... 
is not so much a satire on colonialism as on the abuses of colonialism” (6) in contrast to an authorized empire that 
God allows to human dominion.  (See “Paradise Lost and the Colonial Imperative, ” Milton Studies, vol. 34, 1996, 
pp. 3-21.  Hoxby’s chapter on Paradise Lost argues that Paradise Lost is a conservative reaction to the Royalist 
rhetoric of commerce, but Hoxby nonetheless manages to find a way to value the market through the work by 
arguing that Adam and Eve’s descent into the world moves them into the historical realm of economics and out of 
the Edenic “logic of loss and redemption” (176).  Hoxby apparently does not notice that Paradise Lost’s “logic of 
loss and redemption” is economic. 
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As high he soard, obnoxious first or last 
To basest things.  (163-71) 
 
Satan’s own self-exchangability is a means of advancement in an economy in which “spite ... 
with spite is best repaid” (177).  In returning to Hell in Book X, he celebrates his new “enmity” 
(486) with mankind, and boasts of what he deems a triumphant exchange he has gained by it: 
 I am to bruise his heel; 
His seed, when is not set, shall bruise my head: 
A World who would not purchase with a bruise, 
Or much more grievous pain?  Ye have th’account 
Of my performance:  What remains, ye Gods, 
But up and enter now into full bliss. (X, 498-503) 
 
But for Satan to have “purchased” something in an economy of spite means the opposite of being 
able to participate in it:  to purchase a world is to reduce it to an item of exchange.  Moreover, he 
has purchased it by exchanging himself for the serpent.  At the time, Satan had judged the 
exchange a profitable investment, but in Hell, he discovers the reciprocity inherent in an 
economy of competitive exchange.  Now, at the instant he proclaims his success, he is greeted 
not with a “universal shout” (505), but with “a dismal universal hiss” (508).  The act of 
purchasing mankind in an economy of animosity has reduced the rebel angels to the basest level 
of their own exchangability:  they become serpents.  Even the narrative “account” in which Satan 
takes so much pride signals the end of articulate speech.  “Th’ account / of [his] performance” 
becomes not a narrative account but an economic account that, because it is based on competitive 
exchange can only spiral downward.  By repaying “spite ... with spite,” Satan finds himself in an 
economy that returns only “hiss for hiss” (518) – the opposite of Heaven’s economy of “life for 
life” (III, 236). 
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iv:  The Solitary Plural
Twice in Paradise Lost, Adam and Eve are described in terms that modern editions 
usually render “the only two of mankind” (III, 65; IX, 415).  A third time, they are “two only” 
(V, 366).  In modern spelling, the epithet reduces them to a definite and insignificant number.  
But Milton’s spelling - “onely” makes visible the word’s derivation: one-ly.  To be two one-ly is 
not reductive but paradoxical.35 In book IX, Adam and Eve are “The onely two of Mankind, 
but in them / The whole included Race” (415-6).  They are two-in-one in the sense that the trinity 
is three-in-one, and they share an “individual” soul like Heaven’s.  When Adam first sees Eve 
and she flees, he calls after her, 
Whom fli’st thou?  whom thou fli’st, of him thou art, 
His flesh, his bone; to give thee being I lent 
Out of my side to thee, neerest my heart 
Substantial Life, to have thee by my side 
Henceforth an individual solace dear; 
Part of my Soul I seek thee, and thee claim 
My other half.  (IV, 482-8) 
 
For all the problems of the work’s treatment of gender roles, even in Eve’s genesis from Adam, 
the work’s rhetoric, at first and at the end is the rhetoric of mutual and equal society between 
Adam and Eve. 
 One of the more problematic aspects of the work’s treatment of gender difference is that 
Book IX makes the fall consequent to a discussion some two hundred lines long in which Eve 
persuades Adam to divide their labor.  On Satan, “Occasion ... smiles” when he “behold[s] alone 
/ The Woman, opportune to all attempts” (480-01).  The narrative of Book IX is from union to 
division to a brief but crucial reunion that produces Adam’s fall and then back to “variance and 
accusation of one another” (IX, Argument).  Book X, on the other hand, moves from soliloquy 
back to union.  Soliloquy, I have suggested, is Satan’s mode.  Its subjective sublimity in book IV 
 
35 I owe this observation to Dan Traister. 
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moves Satan to the point of despair – the word appears four times in that passage – and it entails 
a reductive economy.  For Adam, it takes an altered version of the latter characteristic:  though 
its economy does not collapse as far as Satan’s, it is nevertheless haunted by the horror of 
existing finite.  Whereas Eve will despair and suggest she and Adam “seek Death, or he not 
found, supply / With our own hands his Office on our selves” (1001-2), Adam rather bewails that 
death has not come and that he must produce infinite unhappy progeny from himself: 
 yet well, if I would here end 
The miserie, I deserv’d it, and would bear 
My own deservings; but this will not serve; 
All that I eat or drink, or shall beget, 
Is propegated curse.  O voice once heard 
Delightfully, Encrease and multipliy,
Now death to hear! for what can I encrease 
Or multiplie, but curses on my head?  (725-32, italics sic)
Adam no longer enjoys Heaven’s All nor is he become death’s None.  He may not “resigne, and 
render back / All [he] receav’d, unable to perform / [God’s] terms too hard” (749-51).  His curse 
is to exist materially and be forced to spend of himself to pay back a God who might 
 draw out 
For angers sake, finite to infinite 
In punisht man to satisfie his rigour 
Satisfi’d never.  (801-4) 
 
In soliloquy, Adam’s economy becomes as limited as Satan’s was:  “in [him] all / Posteritie 
stands curst,” (817-8),  and posterity “Shall with a fierce relux on [him] redound” (738), just as 
Satan, in soliloquy “like a devillish Engine back recoils / Upon himself” (IV, 17-18). 
 And yet, Adam’s mortality brings with it the possibility of redemption, for to “satisfie 
[God’s] rigour / Satisfi’d never” is to enter into Heaven’s economy of a “debt immense of 
endless gratitude, / … still paying, still to ow” (III, 52-3).  Whereas in soliloquy, Satan could 
only recognize this, Adam can, in union with Eve, effect it.  Whereas Satan had turned from 
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soliloquy to others only in enmity, the human two now turn to each other in “Commiseration” 
(940) to seek “reconcilement” (443) of Eve’s suicidal despair and Adam’s existential anguish.  
Eve, through “love sincere” (914) teaches Adam to “strive / in offices of Love, how we may 
light’n / Each others burden in our share of woe” (959-61), and Adam teaches Eve to shun the 
“self-destruction” that “refutes” the “excellence” she possesses (1016-7).  Although their roles 
are differentiated by gender (Adam surely takes more of the initiative in determining their plans 
at the book’s end), there is, I think, a very real suggestion that their survival depends upon 
mutual responsiveness to each other’s concerns.  In cooperation, they learn to embrace their 
curse of labor, and by it to earn things that possess real value.  By reconciliation with Eve, Adam 
reconsiders what is left to them: 
 to thee 
Pains onely in Child-bearing were foretold 
And bringing forth, soon recompenc’t with joy, 
Fruit of thy womb:  On me the Curse aslope 
Glanc’d on the ground, with labour I must earn 
My bread; what harm?  Idleness had bin worse; 
My labour will sustain me.  (1050-6) 
 
The opening of Book IX had suggested the ideas both that without labor, “th’ hour of Supper” 
might come “unearn’d” (225) and that “younger hands” might “assist” them (246-7), but in 
Paradise, both ideas lacked urgency; there, they sound more like problems devised for the sake 
of having something to solve.  But in union after their lapse, Adam and Eve learn sincerity, and 
can offer to God “sorrow unfeign’d and humiliation meek” (X, 1004). 
 Book XI begins by complicating but not reversing Book X’s story of human 
reconcilement.  In the opening lines, we learn that their agency was enabled by “Prevenient 
Grace” – the Son’s atonement already implicit36 – which “descending had remov’d / The stonie 
 
36 See OED s.v. “prevenient,” def. 2:  “prevenient grace, in Theol., the grace of God which precedes repentance 
and conversion, predisposing the heart to seek God, previously to any desire or motion on the part of the recipient.”  
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from thir hearts and made new flesh / Regenerat grow instead” (3-5).  The notion of “Prevenient 
Grace” does not negate choice but rather gives choice meaning.  With stony hearts, Adam and 
Eve stood no better chance of choosing repentance than Satan with “fixt mind” (I, 97).  On the 
other hand, they must be left to make their choice.  As God asks in Book III, 
Not free, what proof could they have givn sincere 
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love, 
Where onely what they needs must do, appeard, 
Not what they would?  what praise could they receive? 
What pleasure I from such obedience paid 
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoild, 
Made passive both, had serv’d necessitie, 
Not mee.  (103-12) 
 
It is in flesh – the flesh both of the Son’s atonement and of their own hearts – that Adam and Eve 
can learn to value rightly and make the right choices.  In the same way that choosing rightly only 
matters when one can choose wrongly, one can only learn to value things rightly by being flesh, 
having to labor, and being susceptible to scarcity.  There are political implications as well:  
“freedom” becomes a prerequisite for correctly determining value; “necessitie” – “The Tyrants 
plea” in Book IV (394) – voids choices of their worth. 
 Paradise Lost ends with choice:  “The world was all before them where to choose / Thir 
place of rest” (XII, 646-7).  If the last three books offered a course of training in how to choose, 
they have not made particular choices easy.  Book XII offers a litany of answers that it 
subsequently complicates.  First, Adam mistakenly assumes that the Son will descend and win 
the world in decisive battle (375ff).  Then there is the suggestion of the fortunate fall (469ff) – 
perhaps ultimately true, but in the meanwhile there are the “enemies of truth” (482) to be dealt 
 
One tends to forget that Book III transpires before the fall because of its dizzying negotiation of tenses by which it 
“comprises the entire history of mankind in an enormous abridgment” (as another materialist has theorized 
messianic time that can “blast open the continuum of history.”  See Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History,” Illuminations, ed., Hannah Arendt, trans., Harry Zohn.  New York:  Schocken Books, 1968, pp. 262-3.) 
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with.  Finally, at the moment the work seems to be suggesting a turn toward “inward 
consolations” (495) and to a solitary walk with God (561ff), Michael declares that Adam has 
“attaind the sum / Of wisdom” (575-6) and, in parting tells Adam to 
 onely add 
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add Faith 
Add Vertue, Patience, Temperance, add Love 
By name to come call’d Charitie, the soul 
Of all the rest:  then wilt thou not be loath 
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess 
A Paradise within thee, happier farr. (581-7) 
 
It is an extraordinarily ambitious litany of things to “onely add,” but Adam and Eve are denied 
the specious ease sought by their tempter.  Whereas Satan, by consuming the inward, has to turn 
destructively outward, Adam and Eve may only attain inward happiness through difficult, 
productive outward works. 
 Unlike Heaven and Hell, Earth does not enter Paradise Lost with a ready-made economy; 
the point of the work is to create one, first under Heaven’s influence, then by Hell’s meddling, 
and finally by the human effort of learning how to negotiate the world while separate from 
Heaven but guided by it.  But the creation of the earth in Book VII offers a clue for how a 
worldly economy might work.  There, 
 First crept 
The Parsimonious Emmet, provident 
Of future, in small room large heart enclos’d, 
Pattern of just equalitie perhaps 
Hereafter, join’d in her popular Tribes 
Of Commonaltie.  (484-9) 
 
The republican rhetoric of commonwealth is clear enough, but the passage does not only 
celebrate “just equalitie” of rank; equality is also a matter of material needs.   Heaven seems to 
produce ample bounty and those in Hell pretend to have a limitless bounty within themselves, 
but Earth faces the possibility of scarcity.  The ant’s sense of “Commonaltie” is predicated on its 
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sense of parsimony (frugality, thrift37) and providence for the future.  Equality then is not just a 
matter of doing away with kings; it requires shared work and shared enjoyment of the fruits of 
that work, just as the Son’s redemption saves “the whole Race lost” (III, 280) and Heaven’s 
bounty is the result of being “one individual Soul.”  If in Eden, Adam and Eve were “two one-
ly,” the final gesture of the poem is to restore the paradox of the singular plural.  As Michael 
leads them out of Eden, he rejoins the hands that had parted before the fall (IX, 385), and it is 
“hand in hand” (648) that they take, in the poem’s paradoxical last three words,  “thir solitarie 
way.” 
 
v:  Religion and Politics
To Marx’s comment about a Protestant, and particularly Scottish, theology of credit, with 
which I began, I would like to add one point that perhaps complicates the history that Marx 
suggested and that Parker has elaborated.  Unlike the Church of England, Presbyterianism 
rendered he Lord’s Prayer’s fifth petition accurately as “forgive us our debts as we forgive our 
debters.”  Although in theory more radical than Anglicanism in the its critique of materialist 
religion, the Presbyterian Church left in one of its central texts an economy of belief unfamiliar 
to the majority of English-speaking Protestants.  As a child from a long-time Methodist family, I 
dutifully learned the Lord’s prayer in the Anglican rendering of “tresspasses” that Methodism 
had retained.  But when I was eleven, my family moved to Longview, Texas, where, dissatisfied 
with the conservatism of the local Methodist Churches, we joined the city’s two or three dozen 
other liberal Protestants at a Presbyterian Church.  We only stayed in Longview for a year, but it 
was the year when I was the age for Presbyterian confirmation classes with the minister, an aging 
Southerner of Scottish descent, who my father was particularly happy to discover was an old 
 
37 The word could be used without negative connotations at the time – see OED def. 1a for “parsimonious.” 
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New Dealer in a city turning rapidly Republican.  As a new Presbyterian, my most pressing 
question for him was why everybody said “forgive us our debts” during the service.  He replied 
that the standing joke in seminary was that the Presbyterians version was the legacy of 
impoverished Scots who preferred to have their debts forgiven. 
 If my anecdote sounds incidental to a history of Christianity in which Luther and Calvin 
represent a turn away from economic theology and socially valued works, and toward salvation 
in faith alone through the individual’s unmediated access to God, then consider Milton’s position 
in that history.  Milton’s economy of redemption, his celebration of flesh, his insistence on 
Christianity as a social bond that requires works: all these smack not of Puritanism but of 
Catholicism.  Although the condemnation of idolatry was usually a Protestant concern, Milton’s 
condemnation fits more comfortably within the self-criticism that Catholicism traditionally 
allowed (one thinks, for instance, of Chaucer’s “Pardoner’s Tale”) than in a Protestant ideology 
that denies real value to anything material.  My point, of course, is not to argue that Milton was 
really a Catholic - some of these points make at least as much sense if one thinks of him as an 
Arminian.  Rather I am attempting to complicate a narrative of Early Modern theology often told 
as a history of two or three party lines, proliferating, perhaps into a dozens or so more in the 
seventeenth century.  Such a narrative is useful in telling a history of theological debate that very 
often did, I think, depend upon building official theologies and differentiating one’s own party 
from the heresies that rivals exposed when they differentiated their theology from that of their 
rivals.  Official constructions of the sort surely do become powerful in a Christian society that, at 
least in theory, requires everyone to take sides.  But I wonder how strongly these rigidly 
differentiated theologies determined ideology, particularly in the wake of the radical political 
upheaval of the English Revolution.  Milton’s own idiosyncratic theology, I would suggest, was 
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grounded as much in a radical political critique as it was in traditional theological arguments – 
indeed that for Milton, to do otherwise would have been to treat religion as a “dividual 
movable.”  For Milton, a materialist theology entailed a concern for the social relationships 
present in the world.  From the perspective of a modern atheist (my own, as it happens), to posit 
a god is to mystify material conditions, but, taken on its own assumption of a material Christ, 
Paradise Lost exposes earthly hierarchies and insists instead both on equality both of rank and of 
material means. 
